2025 : A Geopolitical Year

Benjamin Ducos, August 2025

Amidst a year 2025 repeatedly described — ad nauseam — as being profoundly geopolitical, what is the reality? This reflection examines the first seven months through a gallery of portraits, ranging from diplomats to insurers.

Undoubtedly, 2025 has been a tumultuous year for diplomats who have followed polling data and analyzed election results across nearly all continents. Notable cases include Lebanon (January 9), where deputies elected Joseph Aoun, commander-in-chief of the army, to the presidency after two years of vacancy. In this Cedar-rich country, tragically scarred by clan warfare, regional ambitions, and destabilized by Hezbollah, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam faces significant challenges — yet, does he possess the means to succeed? Another partly francophone nation, Canada (April 28), saw Liberal candidate Mark Carney triumph over Conservative rival Pierre Poilièvre, who was disadvantaged by the influence of the American neighbor, Donald Trump and its pro-integration tendencies with the United States.

In Germany (February 23), Friedrich Merz was elected Chancellor amidst the collapse of Olaf Scholz’s coalition government (SPD), which lost the confidence of the Bundestag. In Romania (May 4 and 18), the core issues of European integration, NATO membership, foreign interference, and the country’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict dominated the electoral debate, resulting in Nicusor Dan’s victory by a seven-point margin over George Simion. As expert Catherine Durandin notes (Diploweb.com, May 2025), « In 2025, with Nicusor Dan’s election, the question arises: which page has been turned? » Finally, in Poland (May 18 and June 1), nationalist and conservative candidate Karol Nawrocki narrowly won the presidency against liberal candidate Radoslaw Trzaskowski. The real story here is the cohabitation between the sovereigntist president and the liberal Prime Minister Donald Tusk — a relationship that warrants close scrutiny.

In Asia, South Korea (June 3) elected Lee Jae-Muyng in a snap presidential poll following martial law declared in December 2024 and the ousting of President Yoon Suk-yeol. Jae-Muyng might play a more proactive role than his predecessor, especially in the context of Trump’s ambition to rekindle peace negotiations with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un.

Furthermore, as anticipated, Donald Trump’s inauguration (January 20) marked the decline of traditional diplomacy: barely settling into the Oval Office, the U.S. president engaged in a diplomatic standoff with Europe, articulated geopolitical ambitions over Panama, Mexico, and Canada, and humiliated the Ukrainian president. In essence, Trump is reconstructing the world around America’s centrality with short messages on his favored social network, grandiose boasts, and some notable successes — though their durability remains uncertain to many observers.

Another illustration, not on the electoral front but within the realm of alliances, was the NATO summit in The Hague (June 24–25). The first since Trump’s return to the White House, it saw alliance members urged to increase defense spending — Trump repeatedly stated he would not « protect » NATO members who did not « pay their bills, » demanding that defense expenditures reach 5% of GDP, while many European countries struggle to reach 2%. Trump’s approach — imposing his pace, financial demands, and strategic priorities — demonstrates that “Europe’s defense remains under NATO’s tutelage, under Washington’s oversight” (Axelle Degans, Diploweb.com, June 2025). However, awareness is gradually growing among leaders and the public of the precariousness of this arrangement and the urgent need to address it. The lesson delivered on February 14 by Vice President Vance at the Munich Security Conference — highlighting the significant gap in « shared values » — underscores this reality.

The military sphere has also been active since Trump’s second term, at the beginning of 2025. In the Middle East, following Israel’s large-scale offensive in Gaza in April 2025 (dubbed the « Twelve Days War »), Trump authorized American strikes on Iranian nuclear sites (Fordo, Natanz, Isfahan) in support of Israel, employing B-2 bombers and GBU-57 bombs. Named Operation Midnight Hammer, this retaliated against Iran’s increased uranium stockpiles and centrifuge advancements, pushing the country closer to nuclear capability.

Despite claiming to be a « peacemaker, » Trump also convened Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders at the White House to broker a resolution to their longstanding conflict — exerting influence through both forceful rhetoric (“You will have a very good relationship,” Trump reportedly told the guests, adding “If not, call me and I’ll fix it”) and economic leverage. Yet, as always, key subtleties — such as the status of Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh — are conveniently omitted.

In Ukraine, military analysts observe a confirmed return to high-intensity combat, marked by increased frequency and a concentration of combined drone and missile attacks. Russian Armed Forces maintain a dominant position, gaining territory in sectors like Koursk and Soudja. Meanwhile, Russia targets civilian infrastructure through deadly strikes in Kyiv and Dnipro, while Ukraine continues its strategy of targeting Russian logistical hubs, armament depots, and fuel supplies — evident in the extensive strikes in March. 

Notably, the massive operation on June 1 targeted Russian airbases housing strategic aviation, with BBC’s Paul Adams describing the attack as “bold and innovative.” Yet, months after this success, the situation remains largely unchanged, and Zelensky finds himself returning — when invited — to discussions and moments of diplomacy involving Trump and Putin.

In Africa and Asia, CEOs faced strategic obstacles. In Africa, regional political developments and mineral conflicts disrupted development plans. The Economic Community of West African States (CEDEAO / ECOWAS), led by Nigeria, Benin, Ivory Coast, and Senegal, threatened military intervention in summer 2023 against Niger’s coup leaders unless President Bazoum was restored. Subsequently, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, along with Chad, withdrew from ECOWAS in January 2024, forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). These militaries, in power in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad, severed alliances first with France, then the United States, shifting closer to Russia — favoring the private military company Wagner over Western military presence. This shift led to the departure of troops from Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Chad, and later Senegal. In January 2025, Ivory Coast announced a « coordinated and organized » withdrawal of French troops. As a result, European companies that relied on French military protection saw this shield withdraw, with French troops now only stationed in Gabon and Djibouti.

Economically, the military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger endowed their Confederated Bank for Investment and Development (BCID AES) with 500 billion CFA francs (around €760 million), potentially laying the groundwork for a currency replacing the CFA franc. The mineral war persists, particularly in the Great Lakes region, where Rwanda, lacking the mineral wealth of its neighbors, already exploits Congolese gold mines and eyeing tin, tungsten, and coltan — vital for electronics industries — originating from North Kivu’s vast reserves.

For CEOs with operational or industrial interests in Asia, prospects darkened due to Indo-Pacific tensions.

The border disputes between Thailand and Cambodia exemplify the strategic rivalry between China and the U.S., which also involves France. China, seeking to impose « its » maritime domain with a line of more or less nine dashed claims, has « classified water resources as a national security issue, betting on hydroelectric potential — posing risks for neighboring countries such as India » (as Franck Galland notes in Diplomatie, June 2025). Conversely, Indonesia — a « little-known giant » (Jean-Baptiste Noé, Conflits, July 2025) — maintains neutrality by purchasing fighter jets from China, Russia, the U.S., and France. In this contested maritime space, “the strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China is intense — subtle yet pervasive”.

During summer, the ambiguity of the boundary established by the 1907 Franco-Siamese treaty, which demarcates frontiers between Siam (Thailand) and French Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam), triggered escalation, resulting in exchanges of fire that caused over forty casualties. Though a ceasefire was agreed upon after four days, such border skirmishes will likely recur as long as these ambiguities persist.

In the first half of 2025, many Production or Procurement heads have seen their logistical plans disrupted. Supply chain security has become more critical than ever, yet it remains difficult to design and sustain in a world where globalization is challenged by geopolitical risks.

For example, in April 2025, twenty Indian tourists were killed in Kashmir. India responded, and the two nuclear powers — India and Pakistan — clashed anew, reminiscent of their three wars over Kashmir. This heightened tension raised concerns about the operations and supply chains in India, one of the world’s largest manufacturing hubs. The U.S. intervention led to a ceasefire on May 10, restoring temporary calm.

For Production and Procurement heads, uncertainty — more than sudden shortages of energy, raw materials, or components — is the greatest risk. This uncertainty was vividly illustrated by the sudden imposition, negotiation, and reimposition of high tariffs by the U.S. administration within days, disrupting flows and prosperity. In France, the MEDEF’s call in November 2024 for businesses to « secure their value chains » takes on particular urgency in this volatile context.

It also serves as a reminder for organizations with high supplier exposure, especially those subject to DORA regulation effective January 2025, which require from financial services implementing governance, policies, and measures to manage third-party risks more effectively. These measures enable such companies to respond swiftly and structurally to geopolitical shifts that alter sources and routes of raw materials, technologies, and services.

In this respect, at the beginning of 2025, we saw the United States’ eagerness to impose on Ukraine an agreement to create a joint investment fund for the exploitation of Ukrainian natural resources, initially presented by Donald Trump as compensation for the aid provided by Washington to Kyiv in the war against Russia: this was done at the risk (and with the clear intention) of upsetting previous or parallel agreements with other state or private actors.

More broadly, oil remains the quintessential geo-economic and geopolitical weapon. This is exemplified by OPEC+’s manipulation of oil price — most notably, in May 2025, when members — Saudi Arabia, Algeria, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Oman, Russia — increased oil production, directly contributing to a decline in crude prices to 2021 levels. These nations aim to shield themselves from sanctions on Iran and Venezuela and challenge U.S. producers’ profitability to gain market share.

Western operations targeting Houthi positions in Yemen further illustrate the complex nexus of regional conflicts and the need to secure oil routes and infrastructure. During the Israel-Iran « Twelve Days War, » the Strait of Hormuz became a critical vulnerability within hours, with the narrow passage — around thirty kilometers wide — becoming a potential choke point that must be protected at any cost, including militarily, due to the significant share of global oil transit passing through it. Gilles Moec, AXA Group Chief Economist, already emphasized back mid 2024 that “Navigating this fragmented world will entail a lot of agility for global companies”. He insists on the need for companies to think about the location of their production centers “not only in terms of cost and proximity to markets, but also political alignment” and consider “diversifying suppliers across geographies to minimize the risk of sudden stops in trade flows.”

In closing, a word for insurers supporting companies and organizations facing increasing risks and uncertainties: undoubtedly, 2025 has begun as a notably geopolitical year.

Through its advice and independent risk analysis, the insurer has often served as a bridge connecting the diplomatic, military, economic worlds, and the leadership of major organizations and operational heads. Its guidance on investment optimization, operational risks, supply chain security, travel assistance, cybersecurity, and executive liability — among other areas — are deeply intertwined with geopolitical issues.

The 2024 Future Risk Report issued by AXA highlighted that 91% of the experts but also 72% of the general public believe that insurers’ role in safeguarding against emerging risks will be crucial in the future: through their advanced models and data analytics, insurers can help quantifying and evaluating emerging risks, and can apply their expertise to assist individuals, businesses, and the public sector to enhance their resilience to a range of emerging risks including geopolitical risks.

In a world marked by polycrisis — where great powers clash in high-intensity wars with heavy human costs (Sudan, Ukraine…) and indirect proxy actions — the geopolitical factor is poised to remain highly relevant. In 2025 and beyond.

Benjamin Ducos is an associate teacher in Security and Crisis management at Sciences Po (France). He serves as Group Head of information risk management at AXA, an insurance world player.