The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are seeing their position weakened by growing Russian threats on their borders, particularly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Although all three have been NATO members since 2004, they must contend with the ambitions of Vladimir Putin, who keeps testing the organisation’s easternmost members. Heirs to a contested shared history, an essential foothold of Western defence and a prime target of hybrid warfare made of cyberattacks and disinformation, the Baltic states today crystallise all the tensions between Moscow and the West. Between the weight of history, the military balance of power and new forms of warfare, we will see that the Baltic states have become the most visible symptom of an East–West confrontation in full reconfiguration.
A few hundred kilometres from Saint Petersburg, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania occupy a central geostrategic place on Europe’s geopolitical map. These three small countries, which share nearly 800 km of border with their neighbour, long remained under the yoke of the former Soviet power, especially from the beginning of the Second World War – the Soviet invasion of the Baltic states in June 1940 was part of the German–Soviet pact. It was not until 1991 and the collapse of the USSR that Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius regained their sovereignty.
Yet their recent independence, geographical proximity and the historical ties linking Russia to the Baltic states did not prevent these former Soviet republics from drawing closer to the West. This new closeness, experienced by Moscow as a betrayal, did not stop Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from fully integrating into European and international organisations (European Union, NATO, Schengen area, euro area, etc.), deepening their Russian neighbour’s resentment. Vladimir Putin denounces the Baltic states’ membership of what he pejoratively calls the “collective West”.
Because of their shared history, the Baltic republics still have large Russian-speaking minorities, which the Kremlin exploits. Moscow tries to justify its interference in the “near abroad” by pointing to the large Russian-speaking populations in Estonia and Latvia in particular. These minorities are therefore a central target for political exploitation. In February 2006, for example, the Russian president claimed that Russians made up 60% of Riga’s population, a figure denied by Ainars Latkovskis, then Latvia’s minister for social integration.
Beyond the Baltic states’ rapprochement with the West, tensions are exacerbated by Russia’s repeated threats. Lithuania in particular is concerned about the militarisation of Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave on its border, which gives the Kremlin a strategic military outpost on the Baltic, within NATO territory. Vladimir Putin has thus strengthened the military presence in the enclave: according to the Russian authorities, Iskander missiles (SS-26 in NATO terminology) are to replace the Tochka (SS-21) short-range tactical ballistic missiles. With a range of around 500 km, compared with 120 km for their predecessor, these new missiles could threaten all the countries around the Baltic.
Moscow is relying on its strategic position to increase pressure on Europe’s north-eastern flank, isolating the Baltic nations, which are hemmed in together with Belarus. The Suwałki corridor has thus become a nerve centre of Western defence, as the Baltic states’ only land link with the rest of NATO. It is in this context that NATO has developed responses to strengthen its eastern flank. At Poland’s request, Operation Eastern Sentry was launched on 12 September 2025 in response to Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace.
Kaliningrad also has a strategic commercial position thanks to its Baltic coastline. Russia therefore seeks to maintain its influence in the region, as Michel Foucher points out when he defines the Baltic states through the Russian project: “a buffer zone, with the control […] of the Baltic/Black Sea isthmus always at stake in the background”.
Russia’s aim is therefore to assert itself against NATO deterrence, and to do so it is relying on a new tool of pressure: hybrid warfare. Member states are the victims of repeated cyberattacks, particularly on the eastern flank (reinforced because of the war in Ukraine): espionage, sabotage, malware and so on. Last May’s incursion of stray Ukrainian drones over Lithuania, although accidental, illustrates how the war in Ukraine indirectly destabilises the region. This Russian strategy does seem to be destabilising Baltic governments, as shown by the fall of the Latvian government in May 2026: Evika Siļiņa, then prime minister, resigned over the government’s inability to prevent drone incursions.
As a theatre of Russian soft power, the Baltic states seem to be adopting more ambiguous positions towards Moscow, which has equipped itself with effective propaganda weapons. Although the Baltic states are integrated into European institutions and share their values, their domestic political situation is being shaken. Estonia and Latvia are particularly affected by political movements sometimes considered pro-Russian. In Latvia, the Latvian Russian Union party constantly defends the Kremlin’s interests on Latvian soil, while Riga is home to a large share of the country’s Russian speakers. A genuine internal struggle for influence is thus under way between Russian propaganda and Western democratic values.
Faced with the threat posed by Russia, NATO fears a repeat of the Ukrainian scenario in the Baltic states. They form an East–West “bridge”, on the front line against the danger posed by the former Soviet power.
In short, the Baltic states are exposed to Russian bellicosity, which seeks to weaken Western societies by targeting NATO’s eastern flank. The Kremlin is relying on the historical ties it retains with the Baltic states, in particular the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia, but also on military pressure, which especially threatens Lithuania. Finally, Vladimir Putin is reshuffling spheres of influence through hybrid warfare, which destabilises NATO members and heightens fears of a possible future annexation in the Baltic region.
Clémence Lalain
Clémence Lalain, a second-year student on a joint bachelor’s degree in History and Political Science at the Institut Catholique de Paris, is particularly interested in contemporary geopolitical and diplomatic issues, as well as questions of human rights and inequality.
Articles published in the AFCEA Journal reflect only the views of their authors. Article originally published in French on LinkedIn on 25 August 2026. Illustration: KavalenkavaVolha – Fotolia.
This article was translated from French by Claude (AI). In case of any discrepancy, the French version prevails.
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